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In recent years, the right to counsel in criminal proceedings
has been broadened considerably to include the right not only in
the trial stage but also in various pre-trial and post-conviction
stages. The justifications given by the courts have varied among
the sixth amendment, due process, or equal protection.
In order to understand the present status and the possible
future trends of the right to counsel, it is necessary to review the
general background and development of that right.
I. BACKGROUND
The sixth amendment provides that "[iun all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence [sic]."' American courts origi-
nally interpreted this language to mean nothing more than the
right of a defendant to retain counsel.2 In Powell v. Alabama,3 the
Supreme Court for the first time extended its interpretation of the
right to counsel to require that in certain "special circumstances"
counsel must be appointed for the accused at trial because it is
such a fundamental right that refusal to do so would amount to a
denial of due process.' In so holding, the Court reasoned that due
process included "the right to be heard," and that in many cases
the right would mean little if it did not encompass the right to be
heard by counsel; the Court cited the lack of skill of even an edu-
cated layman-much less an ignorant and illiterate one-in the
science of law.5 Despite the fact that Powell was limited to capital
cases,' the Court in subsequent decisions appeared to deem the
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 S. NAGEL, THE RIGHTS OF THE AccusED 148 (1972). For an overview of the early
common law history of the right to counsel, see SPECIAL CoMM. OF THE ASS'N OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y.& THE NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, EQUAL JUSTIcE
FOR THE AccusED 40-43 (1959).
3 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Id. at 71. The Court stated:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ coun-
sel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the
court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law. ...
Id. at 68-69.
"All that is necessary to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case...
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right to counsel so fundamental as to apply to the trial of non-
capital crimes as well.7 However, any speculation to this effect was
dispelled when Betts v. Brady' was decided in 1942. In Betts, the
Court declined to extend mandatory appointment of counsel be-
yond the trial of a capital offense. Instead, the Court left the mat-
ter of the right to counsel in non-capital cases to the discretion of
the state trial judges to be applied when the circumstances dic-
tated that counsel was necessary to insure fundamental fairness.'
The "special circumstances rule" outlined in Betts remained in
force in the state courts for twenty-one years, until the Court de-
cided in Gideon v. Wainwright that the due process "right to be
heard" rationale mandated the. appointment of counsel by state
courts in prosecution for non-capital offenses." Although the lan-
guage in Gideon seemed broad enough to extend the right to coun-
sel to misdemeanors," the decision came to stand for the proposi-
tion that there is a right to counsel in all felony cases.Iz Then, in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court held that a person may not be
incarcerated for the conviction of any offense, regardless of its
classification as a felony, misdemeanor, or petty offense, unless the
accused was represented by counsel. 3
The right to counsel has also been extended to stages in crimi-
nal proceedings other than the trial. The greatest expansion has
been in the area of pre-trial proceedings; for example, the right has
been held to attach to certain preliminary hearings," arraign-
it is the duty of the court ... to assign counsel ... as a necessary requisite of due
process of law. . ." Id. at 71.
1 Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941). In Smith, the Court reversed the
conviction of a man tried and convicted in a Nebraska state court of the charge of
burglary with explosives, an offense carrying a possible penalty of twenty years to
life imprisonment, on the ground that he was not represented by counsel at trial
and that lack of representation violated procedural guarantees protected from state
invasion by the fourteenth amendment.
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
'Id. at 473.
10 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
" Id. at 344. The Court stated that "reason and reflection require us to recog-
nize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person hauled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him."
,2 In 1967, the Supreme Court stated that Gideon v. Wainwright stood for the
rule that "there was an absolute right to the appointment of counsel in felony
cases." Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
13 407 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1972).
" Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
[Vol. 77
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ment,11 pre-trial custodial interrogation,"6 and pre-trial indentifica-
tion line-ups."
II. SENTENCING
At common law, just as a defendant had no right to the serv-
ices of an attorney at trial ,a convicted deferidant was not entitled
to have counsel present when he was sentenced. 8 It was not until
1948, in Townsend v. Burke,9 that the Supreme Court recognized
that, in certain circumstances, absence of counsel at sentencing
could result in a violation of due process. In Townsend, the defen-
dant pleaded guilty to two charges of robbery and two charges of
burglary, after which he was sentenced; at no stage was he repre-
sented by counsel." The record indicated that before passing sent-
ence, the court recited several charges appearing on the defen-
dant's record without distinguishing among those for which he was
found guilty, those for which he had been acquitted, and those
which were dismissed without trial.' Whether this indiscriminate
recital was due to submission of misinformation to the court by the
prosecution or due to misreading of the record by the judge, the
court reasoned that it was possible that the error resulted in preju-
dice to the defendant that might have been avoided had counsel
been present. Consequently, the court held that in circumstances
where the defendant is disadvantaged by lack of counsel at sen-
tencing, it is a violation of fair play and due process mandating
reversal of the conviction.? Since this case was decided during the
reign of Betts,u it is not surprising that the court seemed to limit
its holding to a type of "special circumstances" rule.
Nevertheless, the decision in Townsend was soon interpreted
by several of the courts of appeals to stand for the proposition that
there is a constitutionally founded right to counsel during sentenc-
'5 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961).
, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966).
" United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967). The right to counsel at
a line-up as announced in Wade has been modified by Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 688-89 (1972).
11 People v. Hasenstab, 283 App. Div. 433, 437, 128 N.Y.S.2d 388, 391-92
(1954).
1 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
0 Id. at 738.
11 Id. at 739-40.
2 Id. at 740-41.
2 Id.
11 See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
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ing in federal cases." In Martin v. United States,"0 the first court
of appeals decision to recognize an unqualified right to counsel at
sentencing articulated most convincingly some of the reasons for
the necessity of counsel at that stage:
The very nature of the proceeding at the time of imposition
of sentence makes the presence of defendant's counsel at that
time necessary if the constitutional requirement is to be met.
There is then a real need for counsel. The advisability of an
appeal must, or shortly, be determined. Then is the opportunity
afforded for presentation to the Court of facts in extenuation of
the offense, or in explanation of the defendant's conduct; to
correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the defendants' past
record; and, in short, to appeal to the equity of the Court in its
administration and enforcement of penal laws. Any judge with
trial Court experience must acknowledge that such disclosures
frequently result in mitigation, or even suspension,of penalty.
That it is also true that such discussion sometimes has a con-
trary result, does not detract from the fact that the nature and
possibilities of this important stage of the proceedings are such
as make the absence of counsel at this time presumably prejudi-
cial.27
Later, in Mempa v. Rhay,2n the Supreme Court seemed to
support the conclusions of Martin and the other courts of appeals'
decisions. Although Mempa was concerned primarily with the
right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing, where under a
Washington statute sentencing had been deferred during proba-
tion and then imposed at the revocation hearing,1 the Court cited
Townsend as illustrating the critical nature of the sentencing stage
of the criminal process and mentioned that it "might well be con-
sidered to support by itself a holding that the right to counsel
applies at sentencing.""0
2Nunley v. United States, 283 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1960); McKinney v. United
States, 208 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225 (5th
Cir. 1950).
n 182 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1950).
21 Id. at 227.
- 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
" Id. at 130-31. WASH. Rav. CODE §§ 9.95.200-.220 (Supp. 1967). Under these
sections, the trial judge may, after conviction of a crime by a plea or verdict of
guilty, suspend the imposition of sentence and place the defendant on probation.
Upon violation of the conditions of probation, the court may revoke the probation
and impose a sentence if one had not already been imposed.
West Virginia has a similar provision. See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62-12-3, -10
(1966).
31 Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 77
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Any remaining doubts stirred by the hesitant language in
Mempa concerning the right to counsel during sentencing were
dispelled the following year when the Court, in McConnell v.
Rhczy,3' stated that the right to counsel definitely applied to sent-
encing.32 Most of the remaining circuits, that had not so held prior
to Mempa and McConnell, soon fell into line in holding the right
of counsel to apply to sentencing.?
Although it is now settled that the right to counsel attaches
at the sentencing hearing, there is a vital part of the sentencing
process where the right to counsel has yet to be recognized. That
is the presentence social interview.3' At that interview, the presen-
tence investigators gather the material from the defendant that
will serve as a basis for the presentence report; this is, in turn, the
foundation for the judge's imposition of sentence. 5 The import-
ance of the interview is readily apparent. Nevertheless, how many
criminal defendants are typically uneducated, inarticulate, and
highly suspicious of the criminal justice system? After being coun-
seled up to the time of sentencing that it is better to say as little
as possible, how simple will it be to coax the defendant to speak
freely at the one time openness may be beneficial unless counsel
is present at the interview to guide and encourage him? How many
defendants will be able to clarify and emphasize any mitigating
factors on their own, without the aid of counsel?
It is clear that if the constitutionally guaranteed right to coun-
sel at sentencing is to have the intended effect of aiding the defen-
dant and the court,3" that right must include the right to have
counsel present at the presentence social interview. Although at
present no judicial opinions or statutes have upheld such a right,37
3' 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
'2 Id. at 3-4. The Court stated:
This Court's decisions on a criminal defendant's right to counsel at
trial.. . certain arraignments... and on appeal.. . have been applied
retroactively. The right to counsel at sentencing is no different. . . . The
right to counsel at sentencing must, therefore, be treated like the right
to counsel at other stages of the adjudication.
11 McClain v. Swenson, 435 F.2d 327, 332 (8th Cir. 1970); Vellucchi v. United
States, 430 F.2d 188,189 (6th Cir. 1970); Hernandez v. Nelson, 411 F.2d 619 (9th
Cir. 1969); Rini v. Katzenbach, 403 F.2d 697, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1968).
u Kuh, For a Meaningful Right to Counsel on Sentencing, 57 A.B.A.J. 1096,
1099 (1971).
1 See Note, Employment of Social Investigation Reports in Criminal and Ju-
venile Proceedings, 58 COLU?. L. REv. 702 (1958).
' Kuh, supra note 34, at 1099.
37 Id.
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it is certainly a logical and feasible area of expansion in light of
the ever-expanding scope of the right to counsel.
El. APPEALS
Beyond the sentencing stage, the appeal is probably the single
most important post-conviction proceeding. At common law, an
absolute right to counsel, either for preparing or arguing the ap-
peal, was not recognized. Instead, the determination of the necess-
ity for appointing counsel when the defendant could not afford one
was left to the discretion of the appellate court. The court, after
an examination of the record, decided whether the appeal had
enough merit to warrant appointment of counsel.-
This practice was severely criticized because the professional
services of an attorney, and not merely of a layman, were particu-
larly needed at the appellate stage-first, to decide whether the
case contained anything warranting an appeal, and, second, to
present the issues in an adequate and professional manner. Even
a well-educated layman could not ordinarily determine such issues
as whether the judge's evidentiary rulings were erroneous, whether
the prosecution employed unfair tactics, whether the charge to the
jury was inadequate or incorrect, whether there was sufficient evi-
dence to support the verdict, whether any errors that occurred were
prejudicial, whether there was some "plain error" that, although
not objected to at trial, should be noted on appeal, or whether an
attempt should be made to overrule or modify some prior deci-
sion. 9
Since 1957, the right to counsel for a direct appeal from a
federal criminal conviction has been recognized as within the scope
of the sixth amendment right to counsel." However, it was not
until 1963 in Douglas v. California2 that the Supreme Court ruled
that persons appealing from a state criminal conviction are also
entitled to the benefits of counsel. In Douglas, the indigent defen-
dant was denied appointed counsel to aid in the presentation of his
appeal. Since a non-indigent could retain counsel to prepare a brief
and present the issues to the appellate court, and the indigent was
" See People v. Hyde, 51 Cal. 2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42, 43 (1958).
Boskey, The Right to Counsel In Appellate Proceedings, 45 MiNN. L. Rv.
783, 786 (1961).
" Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957); Ellis v. United States, 356
U.S. 674 (1958).
" 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
[Vol. 77
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required to do this for himself, the Court found a denial of equal
protection and vacated the judgment." Even though the sixth
amendment formed the basis for the decisions granting a right to
counsel for appeals from federal criminal convictions, 3 the court
in Douglas employed an equal protection analysis without even
mentioning the sixth amendment." The Court relied heavily on
the equal protection concept expressed in the "right to transcript"
cases that "there can be no equal justice where the kind of an
appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has.' -'i
The Court in Douglas was very specific in pointing out that its
holding was limited to the first appeal from a criminal conviction,
"granted as a matter of right to rich and poor alike."4 The Su-
preme Court declined to decide whether the right to counsel should
extend to discretionary appeals or to mandatory review beyond the
first appellate decision. 7 As a result the lower federal courts were
left to decide the issue of the right to counsel in discretionary
appeals without definitive guidelines from the Supreme Court. It
is not surprising, therefore, that the results were conflicting.
The Tenth Circuit, in Peters v. Cox," was the first court of
appeals to face the problem. However, instead of reviewing prior
case law and its implications, the court held in a brief, per curiam
opinion that since no authority had been cited, requiring, or even
permitting, a state supreme court to appoint counsel to represent
an indigent defendant on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the right to counsel would not be extended." It was not until
four years later, in 1969, that a federal court of appeals met the
issue head on and proffered any in-depth reasons for its holding.
In United States ex rel. Pennington v. Pate," an indigent defen-
dant had appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court,
an intermediate appellate court, where his conviction was af-
firmed.' He then sought, but was denied, assistance of counsel to
prepare a discretionary appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. The
11 Id. at 357-58.
4 See note 40, supra.
", 372 U.S. at 355-56.
11 Id. at 355. The Court was quoting from Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19
(1956).
11 372 U.S. at 356.
47 Id.
As 341 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
49 Id.
409 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1969).
51 People v. Pennington, 75 Ill. App. 2d 62, 220 N.E.2d 879 (1966).
7
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Seventh Circuit"2 upheld the failure to appoint counsel on the
ground that such denial did not deprive the defendant of either
equal protection or due process of law. The court's primary reason
for this decision, in addition to practical manpower and budgetary
problems and certain Illinois procedure, was its belief that the
United States Supreme Court's explicit refusal to extend the right
to counsel to the second appeal stage in Douglas was tantamount
to a holding that no right to counsel exists at that stage."3 Dispite
the court's emphasis on Douglas as the primary rationale for its
holding in Pennington and because of the tenuousness of that ra-
tionale, one is led to believe that the manpower and budgetary
problems that the court envisioned as being involved in an exten-
sion of the right to counsel were the actual grounds for the decision.
However, even these reasons are weak ones for refusing to extend
the right. Not only would such an extension probably not impose
an additional burden on the bar,5" but, as acknowledged in the
concurring opinion in Pennington, a major constitutional right
should not be sacrificed solely because its implementation may be
difficult and expensive.
In 1973, other circuits came to the opposite conclusion. The
Fourth Circuit concluded in Moffitt v. Ross that so far as the right
to counsel in concerned, there is no basis for differentiation be-
tween appeals of right and subsequent permissive review proceed-
ings." Therefore, the court held that an indigent defendant is enti-
tled to have counsel appointed to assist him in preparing a writ of
certiorari to either the state supreme court or the United States
Supreme Court.57 Since discretionary review is effectively denied
an indigent who cannot retain counsel, and for whom none is ap-
52 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1971), a federal court may entertain an application
for a writ of habeas corpus from a person incarcerated pursuant to the judgment of
a state court if the application is on the ground that he is in custody in violation of
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
409 F.2d at 760.
u Mitchell v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 349, 352 (6th Cir. 1973). The court cited
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), where the Supreme Court observed "that
counsel appointed for the prupose of the trial or guilty plea would not be unduly
burdened by being requested to follow through at the deferred sentencing stage of
the proceeding." Id. at 137. By analogy, the Sixth Circuit felt that counsel ap-
pointed for an appeal of right would not be unduly burdened if required to "follow
through" and prepare an application for discretionary appeal to the state supreme
court.
5 409 F.2d at 762 (concurring opinion).
483 F.2d 650, 651 (4th Cir. 1973).
1 Id. at 656.
[Vol. 77
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pointed, while other defendants may seek access to a higher court
with the help of retained counsel, both due process and equal
protection are violated." The court acknowledged that it was going
beyond the holding in Douglas, but reasoned that if the denial of
counsel to an indigent defendant for an appeal of right dilutes the
quality of justice and violates equal protection, then denial of
counsel for discretionary appeals is a similar dilution and viola-
tion."
The Moffitt court noted that the courts in Peters and
Pennington had refused to extend the holding of Douglas, but it
declined to take issue with those decisions. Instead, it merely sug-
gested that what is constitutionally required now was not required
at the time of those decisions because as available legal resources
grow, so does the ability to implement notions of basic fairness."0
Soon after the Fourth Circuit's decision in Moffitt, the Sixth
Circuit, in Mitchell v. Johnson,"1 held that an indigent petitioner
has the right to have counsel appointed to assist him in preparing
a writ of certiorari to a state supreme court." In a manner similar
to that used in Moffitt, the court in Mitchell used an equal protec-
tion and due process analysis in reaching its decision, 3 and added
the element of the "spirit . . .of the Sixth Amendment."64
Not long after the Mitchell decision, the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to review Moffitt v. Ross,65 Then,
in June, 1974, in Ross v. Moffitt,66 the Court reversed the Fourth
Circuit, thus lending added support to the Peters and Pennington
decisions, and silently overruling Mitchell. The Court held that
neither due process nor equal protection were violated by denying
an indigent defendant court-appointed counsel to assist him in
preparing a writ of certiorari to either a state supreme court or the
Id. at 655.
£9 Id. at 653.
'o Id. at 654-55.
" 488 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1973). This holding is narrower than that of Moffitt
because it concerns the aid of counsel in preparing a writ of certiorari to the state
supreme court only, whereas Moffitt extended the right not only to those seeking
writs of certiorari from the state supreme court but also to those seeking such writs
from the United States Supreme Court.
62 Id. at 353.
Id. at 351.
6 Id. at 353.
414 U.S. 1128 (1974).
" 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
9
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United States Supreme Court."
Concerning preparation of a writ to a state supreme court,
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, ruled that due pro-
cess was not violated because of the differences in purpose between
the trial and appellate stages and the role of counsel at each pro-
ceeding. At the trial stage, the Court reasoned, an accused defends
himself against the efforts of the state prosecutor and attempts to
preserve the presumption of innocence. The role of counsel, then,
is to defend the accused. On appeal, however, the defendant has
already been found guilty and initiates the appellate process him-
self, seeking to overturn the prior determination of guilt. Thus, the
appeal takes the form of an offensive attack. The Court concluded
that whereas due process mandates counsel for a defense, it does
not require counsel to attack a conviction." In addition, the Court
noted that a state need not even provide appellate review. Such
review is a privilege, not a right, and hence, procedural safeguards
are not necessary." The Court felt that unfairness results only
when indigents are "singled out by the State and denied meaning-
ful access to the appellate system because of their poverty,""0 thus
suggesting that an equal protection analysis would be more helpful
in determining an indigent's rights on appeal.
The Ross Court reasoned that equal protection does not al-
ways require equal advantages or absolute equality." In the con-
text of appellate review, it means only that an indigent defendant
is not denied "meaningful access" to the state appellate system."
The Court held that the defendant in the present case was not
denied meaningful access because under a multi-tiered appellate
system, such as that of North Carolina, by the time the defendant
seeks review in the state supreme court, he will have a transcript
of the trial proceedings, a brief that was submitted to the interme-
diate appellate court setting forth claims of error, and, quite often,
an opinion by the intermediate court to aid the state supreme court
in its determination of whether to hear the case.13
The Supreme Court was also explicit in holding that there is
17 Id. at 619.
0 Id. at 610-11.
0 Id. at 611.
70 Id.
"1 Id. at 612.
2 Id. at 616.
" Id. at 614-16.
[Vol. 77
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no right to aid of counsel for preparation of a writ of certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court.74 Again, the Court concluded
that the trial transcript, appellate brief, and appellate opinion give
the Court a sufficient understanding of the case to decide whether
or not to grant certiorari, thus assuring the petitioner "meaningful
access" to the Supreme Court. 5 In addition, although Douglas
requires that where a state creates a right of appeal, all persons
must be given an equal opportunity to enjoy the right, the source
of the right to seek review of a state conviction in the United States
Supreme Court is federal statutory law. Therefore, the Douglas
mandate is inapplicable because it pertains only to a state-created
right of review." The final reason the Court cited for denying the
aid of counsel in preparation of a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court is the long tradition of such denial by the
Court."
Although the opinion in Ross appears to foreclose the possibil-
ity of a mandatory constitutional duty to appoint counsel to aid
in preparing an application for discretionary review in a state su-
preme court, there is a situation that the Court has overlooked. In
states such as West Virginia, which do not have a multi-tiered
appellate system and where all criminal appeals to the highest
court of the state are discretionary,78 the petitioner will not have
an appellate brief or an appellate opinion to aid the supreme court
in determing whether to grant review. This deficiency could well
result in denial of the "meaningful access" to appellate review
stressed in Ross and a consequent denial of equal protection.
The growth of legal aid and public defender systems and the
corresponding decrease in the burden to the bar, the existence of
the equal protection argument the Supreme Court in Ross over-
looked, and the Court's emphasis that its opinion in Ross is in no
way meant to discourage legislative extension of the right to assis-
tance of counsel to prepare discretionary writs79 indicate that the
' Id. at 617-18.
,' Id. at 616-17.
,' Id. at 617.
7 Id. at 617-18.
78 In West Virginia, all appeals from criminal convictions are discretionary
with the Supreme Court of Appeals. W. VA. CoNST. art. 8, § 6; State v. Legg, 151
W. Va. 401, 151 S.E.2d 215 (1966); State ex rel. Wright v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 371,
141 S.E.2d 76 (1965); Linger v. Jennings, 143 W. Va. 57, 99 S.E.2d 740 (1957).
,1 417 U.S. at 618.
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prospect of continued expansion of the right to counsel in the area
of discretionary appeals remains favorable.
IV. PROBATION AND PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS80
It was traditionally recognized that a probationer or parolee
was not entitled to be represented or assisted by counsel at a pro-
ceeding or hearing to revoke such conditional liberty.8 The federal
courts were in accord with the rule expressed in Kelley v. United
States:
Revocation of probation does not demand formal
procedure. The question is simply whether or not there has been
an abuse of discretion. . . .There is nothing here to indicate
that there was any abuse of discretion in not appointing counsel
at the bearing on revocation or probation."2
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided Mempa v. Rhay,3 where
it was held that a defendant has an unconditional right to counsel
at a probation revocation proceeding when a deferred sentence is
imposed. In Mempa, the defendant had been convicted of joyriding
and placed on probation for two years. Imposition of sentence was
deferred pursuant to a Washington statute.' The Court held that
counsel should have been appointed for the defendant at the hear-
ing at which probation was revoked and sentence imposed.n In its
analysis, the Court relied on both sixth amendment and due pro-
cess considerations. The Supreme Court traced the development
of the right to counsel in various pretrial and post-trial proceedings
which "substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected,""0
concluding that sentencing, either immediately upon conviction or
at a revocation-deferred sentencing proceeding, falls into this cate-
gory." In support of its conclusion, the Court cited two reasons:
10 Probation and parole revocation hearings will be treated as identical for the
purposes of this note in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has explicitly stated
that its decisions regarding the right to counsel apply equally to both proceedings.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
St See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 348 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1965).
235 F.2d 44, 45 (4th Cir. 1956). In Kelley, the defendant had been sentenced
before being placed on probation, the sentence being suspended pending probation.
At the revocation hearing, the judge imposed a heavier sentence than the one first
declared for the same offense.
389 U.S. 128 (1967).
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first, counsel's presence is necessary to marshal the facts, intro-
duce evidence of mitigating circumstances, and in general to aid
and assist the defendant in presenting his case as to sentence; and,
second, certain legal rights may be lost if not exercised at this
stage.s Furthermore, when it is considered that imposition of sen-
tence is often "based on the alleged commission of offenses for
which the accused is never tried," 9 the need for the presence of
counsel to assure that the defendant is afforded due process be-
comes even more acute.
Despite the fact that the Mempa Court quite clearly limited
its holding to mandating assistance of counsel at revocation hear-
ings only where a sentence had not yet been imposed," some courts
specifically refused to follow that limitation and extended the right
to all such hearings, regardless of whether a sentence had already
been imposed." Other jurisdictions have confined their extensions
to the deferred sentencing type of proceeding.2
Any expectations that the Supreme Court might extend fur-
ther the right to counsel at revocation hearings were put to rest in
1973, when, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,93 the Court refused to extend
a per se right of counsel to all probation and parole revocation
hearings." Instead, the Court confined the earlier holding in
Mempa v. Rhay95 to its narrowest sense of being applicable only
to revocation hearings where there is deferred sentencing. As to
Is Id. at 135-36. One example of a situation where legal rights may be lost if
counsel is not present can be found in Washington law. See State v. Farmer, 39
Wash. 2d 675, 237 P.2d 734 (1951). An appeal in a case involving a guilty plea and
subsequent probation can only be taken after probation is revoked and sentence
imposed. Therefore, if a defendant pleads guilty because he is offered probation,
even though he may have had a valid defense, absence of counsel at the revocation
hearing to advise him of his right to appeal may result in a loss of that right. Id.
11 389 U.S. at 137.
so Id.
"1 See Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 306 (1972). The Fourth Circuit, Florida, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wisconsin have extended the right to counsel to
all revocation hearings regardless of whether sentence has been imposed. See, e.g.,
Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969); State v. Atkinson, 7 N.C.
App. 355, 172 S.E. 2d 249 (1970).
92 Shaw v. Henderson, 430 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970); Sammons v. United
States, 285 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. Tex. 1968); United States v. Hartsell, 277 F. Supp.
993 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
93 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
" In an important footnote, the Court explains that the opinion would apply
to both parole and probation revocation proceedings. Id. at 782n.3.
Is 389 U.S. 128 (1967). See text accompanying notes 83-90 supra.
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those hearings where sentence has previously been imposed, the
Court adopted a "special circumstances" rule to govern appoint-
ment of counsel." The Court cited three primary reasons for its
holding: first, the sixth amendment does not apply, because revo-
cation hearings are not part of the "criminal prosecution" pro-
tected by the amendment;"' second, various collateral disadvan-
tages; 8 and, third, financial costs.9
In deciding that the sixth amendment was not applicable, the
Court cited Morrissey v. Brewer"" where it was decided that nei-
ther probation nor parole revocation proceedings were a part of the
criminal prosecution.' The sixth amendment approach, however,
seems to have been the logical one for two reasons. First, probation
should be seen as an alternate sentencing process that reflects the
opinion of the judge that this result will best serve the individual
and society. If that fails, then the ensuing revocation hearing
should be viewed as a second sentencing, where the judge again
determines whether a different sentence, that of incarceration,
should be imposed.'° Even though the amount of the sentence may
have been determined earlier, the hearing, nonetheless, is determi-
native of whether sentence will be applied. The second reason is
that whenever a person's liberty is at stake, even though it be
conditional liberty, all aspects of due process that attach to a
criminal trial, including the sixth amendment right to counsel,
should attach to that proceeding. Counsel should be present to
insure that the individual does not lose his liberty without due
process of law. 03
"1 411 U.S. at 790. The test formulated by the Court is that counsel is necessary
when the probationer-parolee makes a request to the court for counsel
based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the
alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that,
even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there
are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and
make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or oth-




10 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
101 411 U.S. at 781-82. In Morrissey, the Court reasoned that parole revocations
deprive a person of only a conditional liberty, whereas the criminal prosecution is
concerned with deprivation of absolute liberty to which every person is entitled. 408
U.S. at 480.
2 Comment, The Right to Counsel and Due Process In Probation Revocation
Proceedings; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 23 C1XV. ST. L. Rav. 151, 154-56 (1974).
10 Id. at 155.
[Vol. 77
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The second rationale the Court bases its holding on is that
extending a per se right to counsel would impose various collateral
disadvantages.' 04 More specifically, the Court expresses a fear that:
(1) the nature of the revocation hearing will be drastically altered
from a fact-finding and rehabilitative-oriented proceeding to a vig-
orous adversary confrontation akin to a trial;105 and (2) the role of
the probation officer will be transformed from that of a rehabilita-
tive officer to that of a prosecutor, thus destroying the probationer-
probation officer relationship."' Regarding the first fear of the
Court, it would appear that the hearing is already adversary and
adjudicative in nature. It involves receiving evidence, and the
judge has the power to incarcerate the defendant and perform
other trial-type duties.' 7 As to the second fear of the Court, it is
obvious that such a view of the probation system as involving a
visionary rehabilitative relation between probation officer and pro-
bationer is extremely idealistic. It ignores the heavy case loads, the
attitude of many probation officers, and the unproven merits of the
system.103 The Court's view loses much of its force when compared
with reality. If the Court would look further into the probation
system, "it is likely to find-as it did in Gault-that expectation
far exceeds achievement and a benevolent purpose too often is a
mask for arbitrary procedure."'0 9
The Court's third justification involves that practical aspect
of the administration of justice that appears so often when the
issue of the extension of the right to counsel is raised-financial
burdens."10 It has been shown that fears concerning the cost of
appointed counsel are groundless."' Yet even if there were addi-
tional costs in extending the right, "neither the nature of the gov-
ernment function nor fear of disruption of that function can justify
the denial of [due process].""'
Any future extensions of the right to counsel in revocation
104 411 U.S. at 783-88.
'1 Id. at 787-88.
i0 Id. at 783-85.
' Comment, supra note 102, at 166.
" Id. at 158-59.
101 Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View
From Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TExAs L. REV. 1, 6 (1968).
"o See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pennington v. Pate, 409 F.2d 757 (7th Cir.
1969).
"I Comment, supra note 102, at 166.
112 Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 102 (6th Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
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proceedings beyond the holding in Gagnon could be grounded in
due process or equal protection. The Supreme Court in Gagnon
recognized that there can be due process and fair hearing problems
in a revocation hearing.' The court of appeals in the same case
had recognized that many of the due process rights in a revocation
hearing afforded by Morrissey v. Brewer"' would be meaningless
without the benefit of counsel."1 It is obvious, then, that at this
proceeding, where an individual's liberty is in the balance, counsel
should be provided to insure that this liberty is not terminated
arbitrarily and without regard to the mandates of due process.
Equal protection affords another possible route to extension of
the right to counsel. Although the Court in Gagnon specifically
reserved judgment on the question of whether there is a right to
the presence of retained counsel at a revocation proceeding,"' a
majority of states allow retained counsel at such hearings." 7
Through application of the Griffin-Douglas equal protection prin-
ciple that has found so much favor in recent years, one can see that
such a practice discriminates in favor of the person who can afford
to retain counsel. Unless the Supreme Court declares that retained
counsel at a revocation hearing is unconstitutional, the equal pro-
tection argument for appointing counsel at a revocation hearing
remains powerful.
V. PAROLE RELEASE HEARINGS
Parole has been defined as "the release of an offender from a
penal or correctional institution after he has served a portion of his
sentence, under the continued custody of the state and under con-
ditions that permit his reincarceration in the event of misbehav-
ior."'1 The parole release hearing is a proceeding before the parole
board where it is determined whether an eligible prisioner should
"' 411 U.S. at 786-87.
11 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 1971).
,, 411 U.S. at 783n.6.
", Comment, supra note 102, at 165. The jurisdictions allowing retained
counsel are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Id.
JIB S. RUBIN, Tim LAW OF CIMINAL CORRECTONS (1963).
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be released on parole. The courts generally agree that there is no
right to counsel at these proceedings."'
Since the parole release hearing is clearly not a part of the
criminal prosecution, the right to counsel as derived from the sixth
amendment is not applicable. Therefore, most attempts to extend
a right of counsel to such proceedings have centered around the
theory that since personal liberty is at stake in the hearing, certain
procedural due process requirements must be recognized, one of
these being the presence of an attorney.
The Courts have met this contention with a variety of counter
arguments. The argument that the courts advance most often is
that parole is a privilege rather than a right, and, therefore, proce-
dural due process is not required. 2 ' However, this theory loses its
force in light of Goldberg v. Kelly, where the Supreme Court stated
that "[tihe constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an
argument that [a party's interest is] a privilege and not a right.
. . .The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded
. . .depends upon whether the recipient's interest. . . outweighs
the governmental interest in summary adjudication." '' Using the
formula outlined in Kelly, the interests that must be weighed at a
parole release hearing are, presumably, the interest that the paro-
lee has in gaining his freedom versus any interests the state may
have, such as avoiding increased administrative burdens. This bal-
ancing formula, and not a right-privilege distinction, must be a
determinative factor.
A second rationale courts employ is refusing to recognize pro-
cedural due process and right to counsel is that the parole release
hearing is a non-adversary proceeding in the sense that the parties
have the same interest-a desire to release the prisoner.' 2 As a
"I See Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946
(1968); Hodge v. Markley, 339 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1965); Washington v. Hagan, 287
F.2d 332 (3rd Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961); Swartzberg v. Oswald,
8 App. Div. 2d 570, 183 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1959) (mem.).
'" Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Mead v. California Adult Authority,
415 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1969); Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968);
Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Hodge v.
Markley, 339 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1965); Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964);
Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Thompson v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961); Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21 ,246 N.E.2d 512, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969).
121 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
I Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Thompson
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result, procedural safeguards to protect adversary interests are
unnecessary.In However, looking at the realities of the hearing, it
is obvious that the parties have different interests. The prisoner,
interested in obtaining his freedom, must convince the board, act-
ing in the public interest, that he should be freed. This situation
creates a quasi-trial atmosphere-an adversary atmosphere-for
which procedural safeguards should be afforded. Moreover, even
assuming arguendo that the proceeding is non-adversary, the need
for counsel at many proceedings that are not traditionally adver-
sary in nature has been recognized' 4 and by analogy should be
recognized at a parole release hearing.
In addition to the procedural due process approach to extend-
ing the right to counsel, the theory has been advanced that the
parole release hearing is a form of deferred sentencing, similar to
that in Mempa v. Rhay where the right to counsel was guaran-
teed.'2 According to the theory, sentencing does not end with the
trial court's sentencing hearing, since the parole board in effect has
the power to lessen the time a person is incarcerated and thereby
changing the sentence. This theory is particularly persuasive in
light of the increasing use of the indeterminate sentence and conse-
quent sharing of the sentencing responsibility between the trial
judge and the parole board.'12 In response, the courts contend that
"the prisoner's sentence has already been finally decreed by the
court and cannot be changed."'2 This is a weak argument, consid-
ering the practical effects of the parole release hearing outlined
above.
Some courts have refused to allow counsel on the grounds that
the administrative burden would be prohibitive. In Menechino v.
Oswald, the court expressed a fear that should retained counsel be
allowed, equal protection would mandate appointment of counsel
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1970).
12 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (revocation of welfare benefits);
Shone v. Maine, 406 F.2d 844 (lst Cir.), vacated as moot, 396 U.S. 6 (1969) (juvenile
offenders being transferred from boys' training center to men's correctional institu-
tion); United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969) (trans-
ferring prisoner to state institution for insane prisoners); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) (juvenile proceedings).
1- 389 U.S. 128 (1967). See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra. The peti-
tioner in Menechino v. Oswald advanced this theory. 430 F.2d at 410.
12 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. §61-11-16 (1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§
1166, 1172 (1964).
I27 Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 1970).
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for indigents also, thus creating an enormous administrative bur-
den on the state.' However, this fear is largely unfounded in view
of the Supreme Court's holding in Goldberg v. Kelly that counsel
need not always be appointed for indigents merely because proce-
dural due process requires the right to retained counsel.' 21
Finally, not to be overlooked are the advantageous services
counsel could perform for the benefit of both the prisoner and the
parole board, such as collecting needed data for the board concern-
ing the enviroment into which the prisoner is to return, his family
situation, and other factors that the board considers in arriving at
its decision.'35 After collecting such information, counsel can use
his training to present it to the board in a clear and orderly man-
ner, benefiting all parties involved.
In summary, the number of recent case decisions regarding the
right to counsel at parole release hearings remains quite small, and
what few there are have decided against extension of the right. The
only forcible judicial support is the dissent in Menechino v.
Oswald.'3' Despite the adverse decisions, however, the arguments
for extension of the right, especially the Mempa deferred sentenc-
ing rationale, are convincing enough that the courts could begin to
mandate, or at least allow, counsel at parole release hearings.
VI. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
The writ of habeas corpus has long been recognized as "the
most celebrated writ in the English law." '32 Its evolution has paral-
leled the development of human rights and liberties within the
criminal process.3 Today, the writ provides the basic method of
contesting the legality of a petitioner's detention.1 Despite the
obvious importance of the writ of habeas corpus, there is one nota-
ble omission in its development: neither the federal government
nor a majority of states has required mandatory assignment of
counsel to assist the petitioner at a habeas corpus hearing.' s
"' 430 F.2d 403, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1970).
"' 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
" 3 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 585, 594 (1971).
'' 430 F.2d 403, 412 (2d Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion).
122 3 W. BLAc1sNTON, COMMENTARms *129.
n Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963).
' See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963).
" Some states, however, have by statute or court rule, mandated counsel at
these proceedings. See note 157 infra.
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The argument advanced most often for the refusal to extend
the sixth amendment right of counsel to habeas hearings is that
the right applies only to criminal proceedings, and, therefore,
counsel need not be assigned to a habeas corpus petitioner because
habeas corpus is a civil proceeding. To determine whether this
civil-criminal distinction is a valid reason for refusing to extend the
sixth amendment right of counsel, the cases that have developed
this rationale must be examined.
The most commonly cited case in support of this civil-criminal
distinction is Ex parte Tom Tong,'3' an 1883 decision in which the
Supreme Court stated: "The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy
which the law gives for the enforcement of the civil right of per-
sonal liberty. . . .Proceedings to enforce civil rights are civil pro-
ceedings . ,. This reasoning has faithfully been followed over
the years in decisions of the lower federal courts.'3' These results
were probably justified at the time in light of the fact that there
was no absolute right to counsel at trial stages of the criminal
process, let alone a post-conviction stages.'39 However, since Ex
parte Tom Tong, the right to counsel in many areas has been
broadened considerably.'40 At the same time, the nature of the
habeas corpus remedy has also undergone considerable change.
Furthermore, in Ex parte Tom Tong, habeas corpus was labeled a
civil proceeding in the context of determining which procedural
rules would apply,' not in determining whether such a hearing
was a part of the criminal prosecution as would require extension
of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Perhaps the most con-
vincing statement of the mistaken labeling of habeas corpus was
voiced by the Supreme Court itself:
We shall not quibble as to whether in this context it be
called a civil or criminal action for, as Selden has said, it is "the
highest remedy in law, for any man that is imprisoned." The
availability of the procedure to regain liberty lost through crim-
inal process cannot be made contingent upon a choice of la-
bels."'
108 U.S. 556 (1883).
' Id. at 559.
'' See, e.g., Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890
(1945); Hodge v. Huff, 140 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Brown v. Johnston, 91 F.2d
370 (9th Cir. 1937).
M ' See text accompanying notes 2-13 supra.
M See text accompanying notes 2-17 supra.
"1 108 U.S. at 559.
HI Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961).
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The Supreme Court's rejection of the civil-criminal distinc-
tion has prompted several courts to abandon that distinction as a
basis for refusing to appoint counsel for a habeas corpus hearing.
In People ex rel. Williams v. LaVallee, the New York Court of
Appeals, while not requiring mandatory appointment of counsel in
all cases, did expressly reject the notion of depriving a habeas
petitioner of counsel solely because of the formalistic civil-criminal
distinction.' Similarly, in Honore v. Washington State Bd. the
Washington Supreme Court concluded that in light of the history
and function of habeas corpus, the "civil" label was inappro-
priate. " '
The civil-criminal distinction as a basis for denying the right
to counsel at habeas corpus hearings should continue to erode as
more courts conclude that "[h]abeas corpus proceedings are crim-
inal within the sixth amendment's requirement of counsel in that
their consequences and subject matter are the same as those of the
criminal trial or appeal.' ' 5
Despite convincing arguments for the sixth amendment as a
basis for extending the right of counsel to habeas corpus hearings,
courts have relied more on other constitutional guarantees, such as
the protection of due process rights. In Ex parte Rosier, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that
under certain circumstances, due process mandates the assign-
ment of counsel to represent a petitioner at a habeas corpus hear-
ing. '4 Although this case was later overruled,"7 it became the basis
for the test announced in United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v.
Wilkins' to determine when appointment of counsel at a habeas
hearing is necessary. In Wilkins, although the court did not recog-
nize a per se right to counsel, it concluded that sometimes appoint-
ment of counsel is necessary to insure a full and fair hearing:
[In certain circumstances the appointment of counsel to
assist a prisoner in the presentation of his case is highly desira-
ble. Where a petition for the writ presents a triable issue of fact
14 19 N.Y.2d 238, 240, 225 N.E.2d 735, 736, 279 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1967).
77 Wash. 2d 660, 664, 466 P.2d 485, 488 (1970).
" Miller, The Right to Counsel in Collateral Proceedings-Habeas Corpus, 15
How. L.J. 200, 209 (1969).
Its 133 F.2d 316, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
"I Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 877 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890
(1945).
M' 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960).
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the clear presentation of which requires an ability to organize
factual data or to call witnesses and elicit testimony in a logical
fashion it is much the better practice to assign counsel.'
Two lines of cases have emerged from the Wilkins rule. Some
have required appointment of counsel where the issues involved
are complex,"'" while others have required counsel because of the
illiteracy or mental incompetency of the petitioner. ' These lines
of cases often overlap and can sometimes be cited to support either
proposition.
In an important case, Dillon v. United States,"' the Ninth
Circuit seemed to be moving toward mandatory appointment of
counsel based upon a due process rationale:
[T]he appointment of counsel may sometimes be manda-
tory even in those areas in which the Sixth Amendment does
not apply. This is true when the circumstances of a defendant
or the difficulties involved in presenting a particular matter are
such that a fair and meaningful hearing cannot be had without
the aid of counsel. Compliance with the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment then requires that counsel be ap-
pointed.1 3
However, neither the court in Dillon nor any other federal court
has undertaken to compile the situations that would mandate ap-
pointment of counsel at a habeas corpus hearing.
Nevertheless, although it has not been decided that due pro-
cess requires a per se right to counsel at habeas hearings, the
majority of federal courts follow the Wilkins "special circumstan-
ces" rule"' and are recognizing the need for counsel in an increas-
ing number of situations.
As with other post-conviction proceedings, the Griffin-
Douglas equal protection principle stands as another plausible ra-
,, Id. at 715.
' See, e.g., Hawkins v. Burnett, 423 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1960); Dillon v. United
States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962); People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 397 P.2d
993, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1; Bolds v. Bennet, 159 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1968); State v. Rami-
rez, 78 N.M. 418, 432 P.2d 262 (1967).
"I See, e.g., Kreiling v. Field, 431 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Tucker
v. United States, 427 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Roach v. Bennet, 392 F.2d 743 (8th
Cir. 1968); State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1964); Darnell v. Peyton, 208 Va.
675, 160 S.E.2d 749 (1968).
152 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962).
'3 Id. at 446-47.
1- See notes 150 & 156 supra.
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tionale for extending a per se right of counsel to habeas corpus
proceedings. It is recognized that there is a right to retained coun-
sel at habeas hearings. 5' In the absence of mandatory assignment
of counsel, there follows the inevitable conclusion that the type of
hearing a petitioner receives depends to a large extent upon
whether he can pay for the assistance of counsel. Courts in several
jurisdictions have reached this same conclusion and now require
mandatory appointment of counsel.158
In summary, although some jurisdictions have by statute or
court rule extended a per se right to counsel at habeas corpus
hearings,'57 the courts in general have been reluctant to require
mandatory assignment. This reluctance has been based primarily
upon an outdated formalistic classification of the habeas corpus
remedy as a civil proceeding. The courts that permit discretionary
appointment of counsel do so when either the issues involved are
complex or the petitioner lacks the mental competency to ade-
quately present the issues. Some few jurisdictions have extended
the right based on an equal protection analysis. There are persu-
asive agruments for using the sixth amendment, due process, or
equal protection as the basis for mandating a per se right to coun-
sel at habeas corpus proceedings, and the courts have shown a
growing receptiveness to these arguments.
VII. CONCLUSION
In its present state, the right to counsel in post-conviction
criminal proceedings may, in general, be characterized by such
terms as "discretionary," "sometimes," and "in special circum-
stances." An absolute right to counsel exists in all jurisdictions
only for sentencing, appeals of right, and probation and parole
revocation hearings at which a sentence is first imposed. Although
there are many exceptions, in the majority of jurisdictions there is
no absolute right to counsel at pre-sentence investigation inter-
views, discretionary appeals, parole revocation hearings, and pro-
' See, e.g., United States v. Keller, 284 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1960).
' Nichols v. State, 425 P.2d 247 (Alas. 1967); People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d
226, 397 P.2d 993, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965); Honore v. Washington State Bd. of Prison
Terms & Paroles, 77 Wash. 2d 660, 466 P.2d 485 (1970).
"I The jurisdictions are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Note, Discretionary Appointment
of Counsel at Post.Conviction Proceedings: An Unconstitutional Barrier to Effec-
tive Post-Conviction Relief, 8 GA. L. REV. 434, 454n.126 (1974).
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bation revocation hearings before which sentence has already been
imposed, parole release hearings, and habeas corpus hearings.
Proponents of extension of the right to such hearings have
advanced various arguments in support of their position; the sixth
amendment, due process, equal protection, the benefit to the court
of a clear presentation of issues and facts involved, and the growth
of legal aid and public defender systems to handle the increased
manpower burden. In response, critics have argued not only that
the sixth amendment, due process, and equal protection do not
apply to such proceedings but that the nature of certain of the
proceedings will be detrimentally altered and that the resulting
administrative burdens on the bar, the courts, and the state render
further extensions of the right to counsel impractical.
Despite the opposition of a majority of jurisdictions to further
expansions, the cases indicate a clear trend toward enlargement of
the right to counsel. Courts are weighing the merits of the argu-
ments, and the number of jurisdictions that are extending the right
to an increasing variety of post-conviction proceedings is unmis-
takably on the rise. Although the process is slow, it is steady. It is
highly possible that, aided by decisions of a Supreme Court that
will acknowledge the trends and recognize the validity of the sup-
porting arguments, an absolute right to counsel at most post-
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